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verdict was partially mediated by sympathy toward the victim, and fully mediated by 
sympathy toward the defendant. Regression analysis also revealed an effect of abuser 
height, such that conviction rates were higher when an abuser was taller than his or her 
partner, regardless of abuser gender. Though not significant, trends suggested the act of 
killing an abusive partner was perceived as a protective act toward the child. Overall, the 
present study provides evidence that gender biases exist in cases in which a battered 
person kills his or her abuser. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Over the last 30 years, intimate partner violence (IPV) has emerged as an integral 
subset of the violence and victimization literature. The present experiment was designed 
to extend the investigation of societal perceptions of IPV, and in particular, perceptions 
of a case in which a battered person kills his or her abuser. This paper will discuss (1) 
IPV, (2) battered women who kill their abusers, (3) legal responses to the homicide of an 
intimate partner in self defense, (4) battered men who kill their abusers, (5) the presence 
of children in violent homes, and (6) a discussion of the present experiment investigating 
the impact of gender, gender height expectation, child presence, and a belief in moral and 
legal justice on mock juror perceptions of a case in which a battered person kills his or 
her abuser. 
Intimate Partner Violence 
Estimating the prevalence of IPV is not without difficulty: though data from the 
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) indicate that 22% of non-fatal physical 
victimizations of women between 2001 and 2005 were perpetrated by a male intimate 
partner (Catalano, 2007), the numbers reported to the NCVS likely largely underestimate 
the prevalence of intimate partner violence against women for a host of reasons. For one, 
some women deny their victimization experiences (Leonard, 2002). Also, surveys by 
nature often exclude many subgroups of persons such as military personnel, 
institutionalized persons, the very poor, and those who are not fluent in English (Browne, 
1993). Thus, it is likely that the prevalence rates of IPV are greater; some estimate that 
one in three women will experience IPV in their lifetime (Browne, 1993; Jordan, 2005). 
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It has also been suggested that women experience IPV at such sizeable rates that women 
sustain more injuries from a male intimate partner than car accidents, muggings, and 
rapes combined (Jones, 1996; Leonard, 2002; McLeer & Anwar, 1989; Stark, 1990). 
Despite these staggering estimates of abuse sustained by women, recent IPV 
literature illuminates a surprising reality: research suggests women perpetrate IPV at rates 
equal to or even higher than do men (Allen, Swan, & Raghaven, 2009; Archer, 2000; 
Richardson, 2005). Given this new evidence, much literature has emerged pressing the 
importance of distinguishing between types of IPV; that is, not all IPV is equal in severity 
or intent (Johnson, 1995). Johnson (2006) has identified four types of IPV: (1) situational 
couple violence, in which a partner is violent and noncontrolling and in a relationship 
with either a nonviolent person, or a violent and noncontrolling person; (2) intimate 
terrorism, in which a controlling partner is violent with a nonviolent or violent and 
noncontrolling partner; (3) violent resistance, in which a noncontrolling partner 
perpetrates violence against a violent and controlling partner; and (4) mutual violent 
control, in which both partners are violent and controlling. 
Distinguishing between types of IPV is particularly important in considering the 
reasons for the equal rates of perpetration of violence amongst men and women. 
Although some research suggests women claim to perpetrate violence in self-defense far 
more frequently than do men (Hamel, Desmarais, & Nicholls, 2007), other research 
indicates that the reasons men and women perpetrate violence are largely the same: as 
reciprocal violence or to gain control, which was previously thought of as a man-
perpetrated form of violence (Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2005). Still, controversy over the 
reason for violence perpetration by men and women persists; some argue that frequency 
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of intimate terrorism perpetrated by men exceeds that of women, and failing to 
acknowledge gender inequities in violence perpetration does a disservice to research and 
recognition of victimization endured by women (e.g., Reed, Raj, Miller, & Silverman, 
2010). However, as Langhinrichsen-Rohling (2010) points out, bias may exist in self-
reported motivations for IPV perpetration due to social pressures. Those same social 
pressures may also skew experts in the field into categorizing women perpetrated 
violence into less certain subtypes, such as self defense against an intimate partner 
(Frieze, 2005; Hamel et al., 2007). Such biases may lead to a lack of acknowledgement of 
intimate terrorism perpetrated by women, and perhaps a failure to provide appropriate 
services to violent women, essentially leaving severe violence perpetrated against men 
relatively unchecked (Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 2010). Regardless of the accuracy of 
frequency of men and women perpetrated violence, Graham-Kevan and Archer (2005) 
found that controlling behavior explained 11% of minor physical aggression perpetrated 
by women, and 12% of severe aggression perpetrated by women, indicating that both 
men and women engage in intimate terrorism. 
Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers 
As violent relationships involving intimate terrorism escalate, unfortunately some 
relationships end in homicide. When a homicide occurs between intimate partners, it is 
most frequently a battered woman who is killed at the hands of her abuser. However, on 
some occasions, a battered woman will strike back and kill her abuser (Walker, 1984). 
Recent data indicate that 30% of all female homicides are perpetrated by an intimate 
partner, whereas only 5% of male homicides are perpetrated by an intimate (Fox & 
Zawitz, 2007). One of the issues central to the discussion about battered women who kill 
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their abusers is what distinguishes them from non-homicidal battered women. Three 
publications have directly compared samples of battered women who have killed their 
abusers with battered women who have not killed (Browne, 1987; Walker, 1984; Roberts, 
1996). 
 Browne (1987) compared a sample of 42 battered women who had killed their 
abusers to 205 non-homicidal battered women who had been out of the battering 
relationship for less than one year. Browne reported that a significant difference between 
the samples was the perception of violence by the women. Particularly, battered women 
who killed their abusers perceived their intimate partners as using more violence against 
them, more frequently, and with greater physical consequence than did non-homicidal 
battered women (Browne, 1987; Walker, 1989). Browne (1987) and Walker (1984) 
reported that a greater percentage of homicidal women reported experiencing death 
threats or threats of death of close relatives (e.g., children) than did non-homicidal 
women. Roberts (1996), in contrast, found no difference in the rates of these threats 
between homicidal and non-homicidal battered women. However, qualitative data 
collected by Roberts regarding the nature of the threats received by battered women 
illuminated an interesting effect: 90% of the homicidal battered women said that the 
death threat included the specific method, time, and/or location of their death, whereas 
only 15% of the non-homicidal battered women reported such specifics. In Robert’s 
(1996) comparison of battered women in prison for killing their abusers with non-
homicidal battered woman, other differences between the samples were that the 
homicidal women were less likely to be educated, to be on public assistance, and to have 
married their abusers than were non-homicidal battered women.  
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Typically, when a battered woman kills her abuser, she does so during a 
confrontation, prior to a confrontation (based on the belief that an attack was about to 
occur) or during an escape attempt by the battered woman (Browne, 1987; Kasian et al., 
1993; Walker, 1984; 1987). Some women wait until their abusers are incapacitated (i.e., 
sleeping), as they reported feeling convinced their abusers would awake and assault or 
kill them (Browne, 1987). Battered women who kill their abusers usually do so with the 
same weapon with which they were previously threatened (Walker, 1984). 
Approximately three-quarters of women who kill their abusers use a gun; the secondary 
weapon of choice is a knife (Browne, 1987; Walker, 1984; Walker, 1989). After battered 
women killed their abusers, their reactions were frequently of sadness and horror 
(Browne, 1987). For example, nearly all of the women in Browne’s (1987) sample of 
battered women who killed their abusers called for help almost immediately after the 
killing, and many of the women tried to administer aid and comfort to their abusers, even 
after police had arrived. Furthermore, some of the women asked to remain with the 
bodies of their abusers prior to arrest (Browne, 1987). In some cases, years after the 
killing, women who killed their intimate partners have a difficult time forgiving 
themselves, and continue to perceive themselves in a negative light – as unworthy of love 
and unable to let go of painful feelings (Smith & Wehrle, 2010). 
Pursuance of Alternative Solutions 
One myth pervasive in the domestic violence literature is the concept that a 
battered woman could simply leave her abuser, or pursue some other outlet such as police 
intervention or assistance from domestic violence shelters. Ewing and Aubrey (1987) 
found that a majority (63.7%) of participants in their community sample study believed 
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that if a battered woman was really afraid for her future, she could simply leave the 
batterer. Follingstad, Runge, Ace, Buzan, and Helff (2001) found that jurors were 
relatively unsympathetic to battered women who stayed in the battering relationship, even 
under the direst of circumstances including threats of death by the abuser. Similarly, 
college students who participated in Follingstad et al.’s (1997) research on mock juror 
perceptions of battered women who kill perceived the defendant in the case as reacting 
differently than they thought they themselves would react, and thought the defendant 
should have been able to retreat from the situation safely. Hodell, Dunlap, and Golding 
(2008) reported that 60% of participants in their mock juror study indicated that the 
reason for convicting a battered woman who killed her abuser was that they believed the 
woman should have pursued options other than homicide, such as leaving her abuser or 
calling the police. Although actual jurors surveyed about their attitudes toward battered 
women were generally aware of the anxiety and depression, fear of death, and fear of 
retribution for attempting to leave sustained by battered women, the idea that women 
should be able to retreat safely in these situations seems to persist (Greene, Raitz, & 
Lindblad, 1989).  
Despite the societal demand on battered women to attempt leaving, battered 
women will not leave the battering situations for a host of reasons. Battered women often 
experience difficulties establishing a life outside the battering relationship, including 
trouble finding adequate housing or getting a job; social isolation, problems adjusting 
psychologically and physically to life without their partners, and long-lasting internalized 
psychological damage (Bell, Goodman, & Dutton, 2007; Enander, 2010; Logan & 
Walker, 2004; Walker, Logan, Jordan, & Campbell, 2004). In addition to dealing with 
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difficulties making a transition to a life without their abusive partner, leaving a batterer 
can be unsuccessful because of increased danger of harm from their abuser (Browne, 
1987; Walker, 1993; Johnson & Hotton, 2003). Abusers will frequently track down their 
partners; separation from an intimate partner is the most dangerous time of the 
relationship for a battered woman (Browne, 1987; Ho & Venus, 1995). Data from the 
NCVS indicated separated women were more likely to report currently experiencing IPV 
than were women of any other marital status (Catalano, 2007). It is possible that women 
who are separated from their abusers simply are more likely to disclose IPV experiences 
and that the rates of victimization are not larger; however, other research supports the 
contention that ended or separated relationships result in more violence and a higher risk 
of homicide for women than do continuing relationships (Johnson & Hotton, 2003; Kelly 
& Johnson, 2008). 
The frequency with which IPV victims call the police is unclear; Jasinski’s (2003) 
analysis of the NCVS indicated that less than half (42%) of victims of IPV reported ever 
calling the police. In contrast, Fleury-Steiner, Bybee, Sullivan, Belknap, and Melton 
(2006) found that 80% of women who had experienced IPV initiated a call to police, and 
Lee, Park, and Lightfoot (2010) confirmed Fleury-Steiner et al.’s (2006) findings, with 
80% of their sample also reporting having contacted police following an IPV incident. 
However, pursuing police intervention is not without difficulty for battered women, as 
police intervention in domestic violence situations is often ineffective (Johnson, 2007). 
Although changes are occurring in state law enforcement policies to maintain consistency 
in responding and increase the number of arrests in response to domestic violence 
incidents, mandatory arrest policies have led to unforeseen consequences (Frye, 
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Haviland, & Rajah, 2007). In particular, dual arrest, during which the domestic violence 
victim is arrested as well as the batterer, has increased with mandatory reporting laws 
(Frye et al., 2007; Hirschel & Buzawa, 2002; Johnson, 2007). Although sometimes 
women are correctly arrested for participation in violence, it is also suggested that women 
are arrested in domestic violence incidents when police are unable to determine an 
aggressor because of a lack of visible injury or because defensive wounds are mistaken 
for offensive injuries (Hirschel, 2002). Regardless, despite mandatory arrest laws, some 
research shows police are more lenient when faced with incidents of domestic violence, 
issuing an arrest less frequently than they are when responding to incidents of non-
domestic assault (e.g., Avakame & Fyfe, 2001).  
Even when police are called and the perpetrator of domestic violence is arrested, 
the question regarding the efficacy of arrest for prevention of recidivism remains. 
Research by Sherman and Berk (1984) known as the Minneapolis Domestic Violence 
Project followed the patterns of behavior of domestic violence perpetrators over a six-
month period following either arrest, an eight-hour removal of the batterer from the 
household, or a suggestion by the police for the batterer to seek help. Sherman and Berk 
concluded that arrest was significantly more effective for preventing recidivism among 
batterers than were either of the other two conditions. Based on the compelling findings 
by Sherman and Berk of the efficacy of arrest in domestic violence cases, the NIJ funded 
replications of the Minneapolis project in other cities across the U.S. In contrast to the 
original findings, five of the six replications with available data reported arrest did not 
deter recidivism (Schmidt & Sherman, 1996). Since Sherman and Berk’s study, a breadth 
of research suggests police intervention and arrest are ineffective deterrents for domestic 
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violence perpetrators, both because of a high recidivism rate among offenders following 
arrest (Hirschel & Hutchinson, 1996) and because batterers frequently are released on 
minimal bail (Jones, 2000). That is, by pressing charges against an abuser battered 
women often infuriate batterers, putting themselves in further danger. Fleury-Steiner et 
al. (2006) report that nearly one-fifth of the victims in their all-woman sample reported 
being victimized after their abuser had been arrested but before the case had closed. The 
perception many battered women have that police intervention would not help is 
frequently confirmed, making police intervention an unrealistic option for these women. 
Overall, battered women do not leave abusive relationships because police 
intervention or leaving the battering situation simply may not seem like a viable option 
for many women. However, the unwillingness for battered women to leave their abusive 
relationships is not a product of a desire to stay; many women will go to great lengths to 
attempt to leave, some even contemplating or attempting suicide. The majority of the 
battered women who killed their abusers in Robert’s (1996) sample attempted suicide 
prior to the killing, self reportedly as a means to extract themselves from the abusive 
relationship. 
Legal System Responses to Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers 
The Self-Defense Defense 
Although most battered women who kill reportedly do so in self defense (Ewing, 
1987; Kasian, Spanos, Terrance, & Peebles, 1993; Walker, 1984); the narrow legal 
definition of self defense often prevents jurors from acquitting in these cases. The 
specific language used across states varies slightly; however, the concept remains the 
same. Relying on language from the Kentucky Revised Statutes [503], in order for a 
 
10  
homicide to qualify as self defense the defendant must have believed that the victim was 
“then and there about to use physical force upon the defendant” and must be under 
“imminent danger of death or physical injury”. Frequently in cases in which a battered 
woman kills her abuser, she does so during a lull in violence either after a confrontation 
or in anticipation of a confrontation (Browne, 1987; Kasian et al., 1993; Walker, 1984). 
The apparent absence of imminence in such circumstances frequently results in 
convictions in court (Kasian et al., 1993). Despite serving as an ineffective means of 
protecting battered women who kill their abusers from conviction because of the lack of 
perceived imminence by jurors, self defense is the most commonly used defense in these 
cases as it is the most accurate reason battered women who kill their abusers report doing 
so, and it is arguably more effective than the use of other available legal defenses such as 
not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill.  
In an attempt to provide a legal defense directly applicable to battered women 
who killed their abusers, Ewing (1990) proposed a psychological self-defense plea, 
arguing that the legal systems definition of “self” only included the physical self and not 
the important psychological self. Ewing posited that protection from serious harm or 
injury to the psychological self is as critical as is protection of the physical self; thus, 
Ewing suggested broadening the narrow legal definition of self defense to include the 
protection of the psychological self. Ewing’s proposal was criticized by the legal 
community for using non-empirically supported and vaguely defined existential 
psychology as a basis for his definition of “self” in his proposal (see Morse, 1990). 
Furthermore, Morse (1990) argued that Ewing’s proposal of psychological self defense 
should not be considered a justification for killing, as most people would not consider 
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psychological misery a justification for homicide. Rather, Morse considers the concept of 
psychological self defense an excuse, which is evidence of a lack of responsibility due to 
diminished capacity. Regardless, the legal and psychological community has largely 
abandoned Ewing’s proposal of psychological self defense, leaving battered women who 
kill their abusers to rely on existing legal defenses. 
 One important factor related to the efficacy of a self-defense defense is the 
instructions provided jurors (Follingstad, Shillinglaw, DeHart, & Kleinfelter, 1997; 
Terrance, Matheson, & Spanos, 2000). Traditionally, in cases that include claims of self 
defense, judges provide instructions to jurors that require an objective interpretation of 
the defendant’s actions in contrast with what jurors believe a “reasonable person” would 
have done. That is, they are to consider only the legal and non-emotional aspects of the 
case. However, some states allow judges to instruct jurors to consider the subjective 
experience of the defendant; to think about what the experience was like for the 
defendant (Castel, 1990; Follingstad et al., 1997). Mock jurors who receive objective 
instructions in cases in which a battered woman kills her abuser are significantly more 
likely to convict than are mock jurors instructed to consider the subjective experience of 
the woman (Follingstad et al., 1997; Terrance et al., 2000). Essentially, by allowing 
jurors to consider how they may feel in the situation, jurors are allowed more flexibility 
with subjective instructions, and are thereby more likely to acquit by reason of self 
defense than are jurors instructed to consider the objective meaning of the self defense 
criteria. 
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Situational Variables Related to the Self-Defense Defense 
Given battered woman who kill their abusers often do so in self defense (Serran & 
Firestone, 2004; Walker, 1989), a considerable amount of empirical research has focused 
on how aspects of the circumstances in which the battered woman killed her abuser 
impact courtroom decisions (e.g., Braden-Maguire, Sigal, & Perrino, 2005; Cheyne & 
Dennison, 2005; Finkel et al., 1991; Follingstad et al., 1989; 1997; Hodell et al., 2008; 
Terrance et al., 2000). One of the primary areas of this line of research has focused on 
characteristics related to the concept of the imminence legally required for an acquittal by 
self defense. Within this domain, researchers have investigated multiple components of 
imminence: (1) the immediacy of the batterer’s threat (i.e., threat), (2) the woman’s 
ability to retreat (i.e., ability to retreat), (3) the time delay between a confrontation and 
when the killing occurred (i.e., delay), (4) the level of force used by the abuser when the 
killing occurred (i.e., force), (5) whether a confrontation was occurring at the time of the 
killing (i.e., confrontation), and (6) the sleeping status of the victim at the time of the 
killing (i.e., sleeping status).  
Follingstad et al. (1989) conducted research using a college sample to determine 
the impact of force used by the husband just prior to the killing. The three levels of force 
were (a) the man was advancing on the woman with a weapon at the time of the killing, 
(b) the man was advancing on the woman with no weapon at the time of the killing, or (c) 
the man physically assaulted the woman and verbally threatened her as in the other 
conditions, but then went to bed. The woman waited until he was asleep and then killed 
the man. Mock jurors found the defendant not guilty by reason of self defense more 
frequently when the woman killed her husband under the circumstances of condition (a) 
 
13  
than the other two conditions. No significant difference was found between condition (b) 
or condition (c), indicating that mock jurors were equally likely to fail to acquit for 
reasons of self defense in both conditions (Follingstad et al., 1989).  
In an investigation of the impact of the woman’s overall ability to retreat safely 
from the situation on mock juror perceptions, Follingstad et al. (1997) manipulated 
whether a battered woman’s husband was awake or asleep at the time of the killing. In 
particular, Follingstad et al.’s vignette study included a battered woman who had 
barricaded herself in the bathroom while her husband pounded on the door threatening 
her. When she opened the door, the husband was either (a) advancing on her and she 
killed him, or (b) had fallen asleep on the bed and she killed him. The woman only had 
the ability to retreat in the latter condition. The college student mock jurors rendered 
significantly more guilty verdicts when the defendant (the battered woman) had the 
ability to retreat versus when she did not. Follingstad et al. clearly showed that the ability 
to retreat is central to jurors’ willingness to convict versus acquit a defendant in these 
cases; however, the vignette provided did not distinguish what contributions to ability to 
retreat (i.e., delay or sleeping status) led to jurors’ propensity to convict or acquit. 
Cheyne & Dennison (2005) investigated how a delay between a confrontation and 
a killing affected mock juror decision making. In their scenario, the abuser and battered 
woman got into an argument and the abuser threatened the woman: “I’m going to hurt 
you like I’ve never hurt you before if you do this again” (p. 392). In the no-delay 
condition, the battered woman immediately grabbed a knife from the knife block and 
stabbed and killed her abuser. In the delay condition; however, the woman waited until 
later that night and stabbed her abuser when he was sleeping. Although participants 
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convicted the defendant at significantly higher rates in the delay condition compared to 
when the killing occurred following no delay, it is not possible to conclude that the delay 
between the confrontation and the killing led to higher conviction rates because the study 
confounded the sleeping status of the abuser with delay. That is, it is possible that mock 
jurors were not impacted by a delay between the confrontation and killing, but rather 
because only in the delay condition did the killing occur when the abuser was sleeping. 
Additionally, in the no-delay condition, the abuser and battered woman were in an active 
confrontation, whereas in the delay condition, because the abuser was asleep, there could 
be no active confrontation.  
In an investigation similar to Cheyne & Dennison’s (2005) study, Terrance et al. 
(2000) investigated the impact of the presence of a confrontation on mock jurors in a case 
in which a battered woman killed her abuser. In both the confrontation and no-
confrontation conditions the man beat his wife, cleaned his hunting rifle, and then fell 
asleep. In the confrontation condition, the man awoke and began to beat his wife again 
and threatened her at which point she shot her husband. In the no-confrontation 
condition, the woman killed her husband while he was still sleeping. Individual mock 
juror judgments indicated that conviction rates were higher when the killing occurred in 
the no-confrontation condition versus the confrontation condition (Terrance et al., 2000). 
Similar to the Cheyne and Dennison experiment, however, it is unclear if the presence of 
a confrontation produced significant between group differences, or if the effect were 
attributable to the sleeping status of the victim, or an interaction between the two.  
Most recently, Hodell et al. (2008) conducted research aimed at looking at 
specific variables related to the imminence of danger and the ability to retreat by the 
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battered woman, providing the first non-confounded study to investigate these specific 
variables. In particular, the presence of a confrontation was controlled across all 
conditions by making the confrontation occur and end with the abuser walking away and 
sitting down on his recliner in possession of his gun. Then, the battered woman grabbed 
the gun and shot him within a few seconds, waited six hours before shooting him, or 
waited three days before shooting him. Additionally, in the six-hour or three-day delay 
condition, the abuser was described as either awake or asleep. The abuser was not 
described as sleeping in the no-delay condition, because it does not make sense that he 
could already be asleep for her to kill him within a few seconds following the 
confrontation; otherwise, such a condition implies a delay or the presence of drugs, 
alcohol, or a sleep disorder. Results indicated delay had an effect on mock juror decisions 
only for women when there was a long delay. That is, men did not consider delay in their 
verdict decision making; women were unaffected by a delay of six hours, convicting at 
the same rate as those who received the no delay condition. However, women who 
received the three-day delay condition were more likely to convict the defendant than 
women who received either the no-delay or short-delay condition. Delay did not impact 
other mock juror decision making, including ratings of guilt and attributions of 
responsibility, sympathy, or blame. The minimal effect of delay found by Hodell et al. 
modifies Cheyne and Dennison’s (2005) overall conclusion that a delay between a 
confrontation and killing increased conviction rates and impacted other rating variables. 
Of greater impact in Hodell et al.’s (2008) study, victim sleeping status affected 
conviction rates such that the defendant was convicted more frequently when the victim 
was sleeping versus when he was awake. Determining that the sleeping status of the 
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victim has a significant impact on men and women mock juror decisions calls into 
question the conclusions made in Cheyne and Dennison’s research and Terrance et al.’s 
(2000) study, as this prior research manipulated the sleeping status of the victim when 
attempting to determine the impact of imminence. For example, Cheyne and Dennison’s 
investigation of delay also manipulated the sleeping status of the victim at the time of the 
killing, confounding the experiment so that it was impossible to determine whether delay 
or sleeping status led to differences in mock juror decisions. Hodell et al.’s evidence that 
sleeping status impacted conviction rates in these cases negates conclusions made by 
Cheyne and Dennison regarding the impact of delay on conviction rates because 
differences found between the immediate and delay condition in their study could be 
attributed to delay, or to the victim’s sleeping status at the time of the killing. 
Variables Related to Defendant Characteristics  
Other research on mock juror perceptions of cases in which a battered woman 
killed her abuser has centered on variables related to characteristics of the battered 
women. Undergraduate participants in Follingstad, Brondino, and Kleinfelter’s (1996) 
study received a case in which a battered woman killed her abusive husband with a 
description of the wife as a good wife, bad wife, or dysfunctional wife. The good wife 
was described as a pacifist, family oriented, non-substance using, and faithful. The bad 
wife was described as argumentative and critical of her husband, lazy, and self indulgent. 
The dysfunctional wife was described as abusing alcohol and medications, spacy, 
suicidal, and possibly unfaithful to her husband. Consistent with Follingstad et al.’s 
(1996) predictions, jurors were more likely to convict the bad wife or the dysfunctional 
wife than the good wife. Contrary to expectations, jurors were also more likely to convict 
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the bad wife than the dysfunctional wife, possibly because mock jurors attributed the 
characteristics of the dysfunctional wife as a product of her victimization; therefore 
exempting her from responsibility for her behavior (Follingstad et al., 1996). 
Individual Juror Characteristics 
Demographic variables. In terms of demographic variables, participant gender 
predicts a small amount of variance in mock juror behavior in a variety of crimes, 
including when a battered woman kills her abuser. Women participants are typically 
more pro-victim than are men, rendering more guilty verdicts and rating the alleged 
victim as more believable than do men (e.g., Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; Haegerich & 
Bottoms, 2000; Hodell et al., 2008). Although Cheyne and Dennison (2005) found no 
impact of mock juror gender in their investigation of battered women who kill, other 
research has found reverse effects of mock juror gender – women tend to be more pro-
defense in these cases (Follingstad et al., 1997; Hodell et al., 2008; Kasian et al., 1993; 
Russell & Melillo, 2006; Schuller, Smith, & Olson, 1994; Terrance et al., 2000). In cases 
in which battered women kill their abusers, the line between perpetrator and victim 
becomes somewhat hazy, as the woman may be considered a victim of domestic violence 
with the abuser as the perpetrator, but in the case at hand, the woman is the defendant and 
the abuser is the victim of homicide. A reverse juror gender effect suggests that women 
are more likely to identify with the battered woman or find the situation more credible 
than are men (Follingstad et al., 1997). Additionally, women are victimized more 
frequently than are men (Bottoms, 1993), perhaps leading women to relate to the alleged 
physical victimization experienced by the defendant in the case more than men. Other 
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demographic variables are typically unrelated to mock juror perception research on IPV 
and battered women who kill their abusers (e.g., Follingstad et al., 1997). 
Support for moral justice. An individual factor that may influence perceptions of 
guilt in cases in which a battered person kills his or her abuser is a belief in vigilante, or 
moral, justice. It is suggested that battered women who kill their abusers are likely to be 
convicted because the typical scenario in which the killing occurs falls outside the narrow 
legal definition of self-defense (see KRS 503). Typically, a killing in these cases occurs 
during a lull in violence either after a confrontation or in anticipation of a confrontation 
(Browne, 1987; Kasian et al., 1993; Walker, 1984). Thus, an acquittal in such cases may 
theoretically be an exertion of one’s right to consider moral justice.  
Jury nullification is a process by which a jury acquits a defendant, though legally 
guilty, on the basis of moral justification (Greene, Heilbrun, Fortune, & Nietzel, 2007). 
Research suggests that the public’s judgments of fairness or justifiability are not always 
in line with legal definitions of justice (Skitka & Houston, 2001). Rather, people vary on 
their perception of moral justice and their likelihood to engage in vigilante justice 
(Kovandzic, Kleck, & Gertz, 1998; Neapolitan, 1987). Skitka (2003) proposed the 
accessible identity model (AIM) as an explanation for the existence of moral and legal 
inequities such as jury nullification. The AIM suggests that individuals make decisions 
about fairness and justice in relation to the impact on one’s self. A review of relevant 
research by Skitka (2003) shows that people are more thoughtful about justice when it 
threatens one’s personal identity or their group identity. Thus, in the case in which a 
battered person kills his or her abuser, identity with either the abuser or the abused 
partner as a group member may impact individual ratings of belief in moral justice. It is 
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likely that in cases in which a battered person kills his or her abuser, mock jurors who 
have stronger belief in vigilante justice will be more likely to acquit than will mock jurors 
who believe less in the efficacy of vigilante justice. 
Support for legal justice. Similar to support of moral justice, there also may be 
individual variability in a belief in legal justice. That is, there may be some people who 
have a greater propensity to have faith in the legal system, to believe strongly in an 
accurate and fair justice system, and may spend more time considering the fairness of 
court cases. Skitka and Houston (2001) showed using their moral mandate scale that 
people tend to share a normative belief that the guilty must be convicted and the innocent 
acquitted, and that people care about the fairness of trials. It is possible that individual 
variability in the belief in the fairness of the legal system may impact perceptions of 
cases in which a battered person kills his or her abuser. 
Battered Men Who Kill Their Abusers 
 Consider the case of Darren and Charla Mack. On June 12, 2006, Darren Mack 
fatally stabbed his wife Charla in the garage of their Reno, Nevada home. Darren fled to 
Mexico; less than two weeks after the stabbing, he turned himself in to Mexican 
authorities. Darren did not deny killing Charla, but claimed that he did so in self defense, 
citing a history of psychological and physical abuse by his wife. Furthermore, Darren 
claimed that on the day of her death, Charla attacked him and in the scuffle, a pistol fell 
from Darren’s pocket. According to his story, Charla picked up the pistol and pointed it 
at her husband. The pistol misfired and Mack instinctively pulled out a knife he also was 
carrying and stabbed Charla in the neck, ending her life. Darren pled guilty to the murder 
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of his wife and accepted a sentence of life in prison, receiving little empathy from the 
trial jurors, the media, and the community at large (Associated Press, 2007).  
 As illustrated by the Darren Mack case, men claim to kill their abusive wives in 
self defense. Generally, people are less sympathetic to such claims by men than the same 
claims by women (George, 1994). One reason people have difficulty believing a man 
may be battered so substantially that he kills in self defense is a gender stereotype 
regarding size and strength; that is, a societal expectation that men are physically larger 
and stronger than are women, so that they should be able to protect themselves without 
using lethal force (Migliaccio, 2002). Some researchers argue that the larger stature of 
men diminishes their victimization experience so that it cannot be the same, or perhaps as 
grave, as the battering of a woman (George, 1994; Pagelow, 1985). Additionally, the 
notion that the nature of violence against women is different than that of violence against 
men leads some to neglect a discussion of violence against men as an equitably serious 
offense (Pagelow, 1985; Walker, 1979). As noted by George (1994), academic response 
to the contention that men experience domestic violence has been minimal. Since 
George’s notation, more research have arisen investigating issues related to violence 
against men and the community has generally moved more toward recognition of such 
violence (Kelly & Johnson, 2008). 
As researchers have moved toward the acknowledgment of men as battered, some 
contend that the term “battered women” excludes men who are similarly victimized and 
propose modifying the term to “spouse abuse” or “family violence” (Tjaden & Thonnes, 
2000). Others believe moving away from the term battered women diminishes the 
experiences of these women (e.g., Pagelow, 1985); as research shows, women are far 
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more likely to sustain life threatening injuries or to be killed by an intimate partner than 
are men (Tjaden & Thonnes, 2000). One could argue however, that spousal abuse is 
equally detrimental to every individual who is victimized, regardless of his or her group 
membership. Furthermore, it is unquestioned that women are the aggressors in some 
relationships (Kelly & Johnson, 2008) and some research even suggests women aggress 
against men as much as and possibly even more than do men with some types of IPV 
(Johnson, 2006; Kwong, Bartholomew, & Dutton, 1999; Prospero, 2008). It should be 
noted; however, that women who are considered “battered” are those involved in 
relationships with coercive controlling violence, of which the primary element is control 
of one partner over another. Women who aggress against men typically do so using 
situational couple violence, which is described as violence between a couple during an 
escalation in a fight, and lacks an element of control exertion by the perpetrator (Kelly & 
Johnson, 2008). The rate of women who exert control and power over their intimate 
partners is far less frequent than men who utilize violence as a means of gaining control 
(Johnson, 2006). Regardless of frequency, there is no theoretical reason to believe men 
could not kill abusive spouses in self defense. 
Despite possibly equivalent rates of aggression by women and men in intimate 
partner relationships, research shows that women are more likely to experience serious 
injury from IPV than are men (Rand, 1997). However, men also experience serious 
physical injury from IPV (Kelly & Johnson, 2008; Tjaden & Thonnes, 2000). Some 
research indicates women are more likely to use a weapon during a physical assault than 
are men because of the necessity to rely on alternative methods of violence than physical 
strength (Straus, 1980). 
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 Overall, investigations on perceptions of domestic violence cases involving men 
as victims indicate that situations in which a man is battered by his wife are taken less 
seriously than are domestic violence cases in which a woman is battered by her husband 
(George, 1994; Harris & Cook, 1994; Pagelow, 1985). For example, Harris and Cook 
(1994) found that participants in their college sample viewed a battering situation as more 
violent when the victim was a woman than when the victim was a man; and, participants 
said they would be more likely to call the police for help if the victim were a woman 
versus a man. Unfortunately, men who are victimized are not treated with the same care, 
respect, and seriousness as are women who are victimized, illuminating an unfortunate 
gender bias in domestic violence cases. 
Research on victim and perpetrator blame in domestic violence cases provides 
insight into how men and women are differentially held responsible for the violence 
regardless of their role in the dispute (Worthen & Varnado-Sullivan, 2005). In general, 
when a domestic violence victim is a man, more blame is attributed to him for his 
victimization than is a woman when she is victimized (Harris & Cook, 1994). However, 
Cook and Harris (1995) found that regardless of whether it was a woman or a man, the 
instigator of the violence was held more responsible for the violent incident in a case in 
which bidirectional battering occurred. 
Men and women participants also differ in their perceptions of domestic violence 
in terms of blame attribution (Bryant & Spencer, 2003; Harris & Cook, 1994). Bryant and 
Spencer (2003) found that men attributed more blame to domestic violence victims than 
did women. Considering both participant sex and victim sex, qualitative data collected by 
Harris and Cook (1994) indicated that men, but not women, participants said a man being 
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victimized should stand up to his abuser, or fight back. In contrast, no mention was made 
regarding women standing up to abusers. Unfortunately, violence against men tends to be 
considered less severe and is taken less seriously than equivalent violence perpetrated 
against women. 
Gender and Size 
Societal considerations of what is “socially normal” in terms of gender roles 
dictate expectations regarding the size and role of men and women in our culture 
(Helgeson, 1994; Migliaccio, 2002). Relevant to the present study, research suggests 
societal gender norms dictate men should be taller than women (Helgeson, 1994) and the 
majority of people strongly prefer male mates be taller than their female counterparts 
(Salska et al., 2008; Swami et al., 2008). The origins of such a preference may be 
evolutionary: male height may be an indicator of heritable superiority, and therefore be 
preferential for transferring to offspring. However, it is also likely that internalization of 
social norms is strongly related to mate height preferences (Salska et al., 2008).  
 In addition to a general preference for male mates to be taller than their female 
partners, the height of men in comparison to average height influences perceptions of 
masculinity, athletic ability, and personal adjustment (Jackson & Ervin, 1992). 
Participants in Jackson and Ervin’s (1992) study rated men of average height or taller as 
more athletically oriented, more masculine, and better adjusted than men who were 
shorter than average height. Despite the general preference for a male mate to be taller 
than a female mate (Salska et al., 2008), taller women are perceived as more intelligent, 
more affluent, more ambitious, and more assertive than shorter women (Chu & Geary, 
2005). Findings regarding gender height bias are particularly relevant to the present study 
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as perceptions of such characteristics may influence participants’ perceptions of the 
abusive partner, or the necessity for one partner to kill the other in self-protection. Even 
experts find it reasonable to conclude that men are more likely than women to be able to 
defend themselves from an partner who perpetrates intimate terrorism; however, Graham-
Kevan and Archer (2003) found no such effect in their study; men were no more likely 
than women to retaliate against intimate terrorism with violence.  
The Presence of Children in Violent Homes 
The issue of child welfare has largely been overlooked in the mock juror research 
on battered women who kill their abusers. Children often suffer through years of 
witnessing domestic violence; and unfortunately, children in homes where domestic 
violence is present are at risk of physical and/or sexual abuse (Davies & Krane, 2006; 
Mbilinyi, Edleson, Haegmeister, & Beeman, 2007). Estimates indicate that as many as 
half of abusers batter their children as well as their intimate partners (Mbilinyi et al., 
2007; Walker, 1984; 1989). Even more disturbing, among the homicidal battered women 
in Browne’s (1987) study, 71% of the abusers had also physically or sexually assaulted 
their child. Even without the presence of intentional abuse against children in violent 
homes, sometimes children will be accidentally injured during a domestic dispute, 
making the household dangerous for children as well as their abused parents (Mbilinyi et 
al., 2007). 
Many children who live in violent homes and escape abuse frequently witness the 
abuse of a parent. Unfortunately, children who witness abuse often are negatively 
affected by witnessing violence; deleterious effects on children from witnessing domestic 
violence include psychological, cognitive, behavioral, social, and developmental deficits 
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(Grych, Jouriles, Swank, McDonald, & Norwood, 2000; Katz, Hessler, & Annest, 2007; 
Lehmann, 1997; McGee, 1997; Minze, McDonald, Rosentraub, & Jouriles, 2010; Nixon, 
Tutty, Weaver-Dunlop, & Walsh, 2007; Wolfe, Zak, Wilson, & Jaffe, 1986). In 
particular, research suggests children who witness abuse (in comparison to children from 
non-violent homes) have lower social competency (Wolfe et al., 1986), lower school 
performance (Wolfe et al., 1986), lower emotional competency and awareness (Katz et 
al., 2007), and experience higher rates of PTSD (Lehmann, 1997). Children who witness 
IPV are at risk for adjustment problems (Graham-Bermann, Gruber, Howell, & Girz, 
2009; Owen, Thompson, Shaffer, Jackson, & Kaslow, 2009). For example, Graham-
Bermann et al. (2009) report finding that 35% of children exposed to IPV have severe 
adjustment problems or depression; and further report a negative relationship between the 
amount of IPV witnessed and adjustment problems. It should be noted that 
methodological concerns (e.g., samples from shelters, a failure to distinguish between 
children who solely witnessed abuse vs. experienced abuse personally) and some research 
failing to find substantial differences between child witnesses of domestic violence and 
non-witnesses in some areas (e.g., Grych et al., 2000) raise concerns regarding the 
validity of research suggesting children experience negative effects from witnessing 
domestic violence. Generally, researchers recognize that children who witness domestic 
violence do experience maladjustment from exposure to violence in various forms, but 
characteristics of each child, circumstances of the domestic violence, longevity of 
exposure, and other case variables impact the level and type of maladjustment 
experienced (Nixon et al., 2007). 
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Most people consider exposing children to domestic violence poor parenting, and 
many consider the failure to remove their child from a situation in which the child is a 
witness to domestic abuse a form of child mistreatment in itself (Wilson, 1998). Even 
when the abuser in a household is a father, mothers are sometimes held more responsible 
for the welfare of their children than are the actual abusers (Edleson, 1998; Landsman & 
Hartley, 2007). In fact, experts that regularly deal with issues of child safety, such as 
child welfare workers, attribute more responsibility of child safety to the mother than the 
father in domestic violence situations when the father is violent toward the mother 
(Landsman & Hartley, 2007). Unfortunately, being a mother is not a protective factor 
against IPV duration or severity, and may even increase risk of duration of IPV 
postseparation (Vatnar & Bjorkly, 2010). Motherhood presents a difficult position for 
battered women: is it better to remove children from the abusive household, thereby 
removing stability, financial support and emotional support, and still risking continued 
IPV; or stay in the abusive household, maintaining support, but ensuring exposure to 
IPV? Though public perception is that women should remove their children from abusive 
homes, many women who have children report staying or returning to abusive 
relationships primarily because of their children (Vatnar & Bjorkly, 2010), staying in 
order to maintain that stability and support (Moe, 2009). 
Critics of the skewed attribution of responsibility for child welfare on mothers 
posit that the focus on mothers in societal and legal responses to child abuse situations is 
irresponsible and ineffective (Edleson, 1998). That is, situations in which a man in the 
home is abusing a child, the mother of the child is relied upon by social agencies to take 
action to protect their child; while the perpetrator of abuse is largely neglected by 
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agencies. For example, Edleson (1998) argues that it is counterintuitive to assure safety to 
a woman and her child when no action is taken against the perpetrator of violence. Given 
the attribution of blame rests largely on the maternal figure in a child’s life for protection 
from harm, it is possible that battered women who kill their abusers will be perceived as 
less responsible for the killings if they do so to protect their children. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Present Experiment 
 The purpose of the proposed experiment is to investigate variables related to gender 
stereotyping in cases of battered persons who kill their abusers. In particular, the 
proposed experiment will investigate the role of gender as related to stereotypes of size 
and responsibility for child welfare in mock juror decisions in a case in which a battered 
person kills his or her spouse allegedly in self defense. Although there is no theoretical 
reason to believe battered men do not kill their abusers in self defense, no research to date 
has investigated how mock jurors may perceive these cases. Additionally, it is likely 
gender stereotypes may play a role in determining guilt and responsibility in a case in 
which a battered person kills an abusive partner. Given people expect men to be taller and 
stronger than women (Migliaccio, 2002), a larger man should thereby be able to stand up 
to his abusive woman partner without necessitating the use of deadly force. In addition to 
gender and height norms, the proposed experiment will investigate the impact of mock 
juror perceptions in cases in which a battered person kills his or her abuser when children 
are present in the household. Thus, the proposed experiment is designed to (a) investigate 
how mock jurors perceive cases in which a battered woman killed her abuser in contrast 
to a battered man who killed his abuser, (b) determine if stereotypes about the physical 
stature of men and women modify the impact of gender in decisions in a case in which a 
battered person kills his or her abuser, (c) if the presence of a child in the household 
impacts mock juror decisions in these cases, and (d) examine the impact of individual 
belief in moral justice and  belief in legal justice. 
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Method 
Participants 
Forty-nine men (25.9%) and one hundred forty women (74.1%) undergraduate 
college students enrolled in Introduction to Psychology at the University of Kentucky in 
Lexington, Kentucky participated in the present study. All students received partial credit 
toward fulfillment of a class requirement. Only students who were at least 18 years old 
and U.S. citizens, and therefore jury eligible, participated in the study. Participants 
ranged in age from 18 to 59, although 95% of the sample was between 18 and 27. The 
majority of the sample (88.4%) was Caucasian, 6.3% identified as Black, 4.2% Asian, 
and 2.1% Hispanic. This race composition is similar to the general community of 
Lexington, Kentucky, the location of the University of Kentucky (U.S. Census, 2000).  
Design 
 The present experiment was a 2 (Abuser Gender) x 2 (Abuser Height) x 2 (Child 
Presence) factorial design. The levels of abuser gender were that the abuser was a man 
(husband/father) or a woman (wife/mother). So as not to introduce an influence of 
homosexual versus heterosexual domestic violence (see Blasko, Winek, & Bieschke, 
2007; Bornstein, Kaplan, & Perry, 2007; Brown, 2008), only heterosexual relationships 
were included in the present study. Moreover, perpetrators of intimate partner violence 
are most frequently of the opposite gender (Catalano, 2007). The levels of height were 
that the abuser was either described as 5 inches taller than the battered spouse, or 5 inches 
shorter than his or her spouse. The levels of child presence were that there was no child 
present in the household or there was a child present in the home during the killing, but 
did not witness the killing.  
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Materials  
Trial summary. The trial summary provided information regarding a case in 
which a battered person killed his or her abuser and entered a plea of not guilty by reason 
of self defense (see Appendix A). The summary included opening instructions to mock 
jurors, the case presented by the prosecution and the defense, and the judge’s instructions 
to mock jurors. First, trial background was presented, including a stipulation that the 
defendant was abused by his or her spouse pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute 
503.050, which admits evidence of prior acts of domestic violence and abuse on the 
following relevant contingencies: 
“503.050 Use of physical force in self-protection -- Admissibility of evidence 
of prior acts of domestic violence and abuse.  
... (3) Any evidence presented by the defendant to establish the existence of a 
prior act or acts of domestic violence and abuse as defined in KRS 403.720 by the 
person against whom the defendant is charged with employing physical force shall 
be admissible under this section.” 
The prosecution’s case included the testimony of three witnesses: a co-worker of 
the defendant, a neighbor of the defendant and victim who witnessed the killing, and the 
autopsy doctor. The case for the defense contained testimony of a different co-worker of 
the defendant, the defendant himself or herself, and the Chief of Police.  
The judge’s instructions included legal criteria using Kentucky Revised Statutes 
for Intentional Murder [KRS 507.020], First-Degree Manslaughter [KRS 507.030], and 
Self-Protection [KRS 503.050]. First-degree manslaughter differs from intentional 
murder in regard to the consideration of the mental state of the defendant at the time of 
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the killing. In particular, instructions for manslaughter include the qualification: “He 
intended to cause the death of another person, and thereby caused the death of such 
person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because 
he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance”. In Kentucky, a conviction 
of first-degree (intentional) murder carries a minimum 25-year sentence and is a capital 
offense, whereas the minimum sentence for first-degree manslaughter is 10 years and is 
not a capital offense. 
Manipulation check questions. Throughout reading the trial summary, participants 
were asked manipulation check questions as well as distractor questions (so as not to alert 
participants to the manipulations in the present study) on each page of the survey (see 
Appendix B). 
Trial-summary questionnaire. First, participants rated the guilt of the defendant 
on a scale of 1-10 with only the endpoints labeled (1 = not at all guilty, 10 = completely 
guilty). Next, participants rendered a verdict on the case of guilty of first-degree murder, 
guilty of manslaughter, or not guilty by reason of self defense. After rendering verdicts, 
participants completed an item reliant on qualitative data that asked participants to write 
what led to their verdicts, with multiple reasons allowed. Rating questions aimed at 
influences on primary courtroom decision making (i.e., guilt/verdict) followed. 
Specifically, participants used a 10-point rating scale with the endpoints labeled to rate 
the victim and defendants’ responsibility for the death of the victim (1 = not at all 
responsible, 10 = completely responsible) and sympathy toward the victim and the 
defendant (1 = none at all, 10 = a lot). Participants also responded to rating questions 
regarding their perceptions of the psychological well-being/perception of the defendant 
 
32  
and victim at the time of the killing. In particular, participants rated the perceived fear of 
the victim and defendant just prior to the killing (1 = none at all, 10 = a lot), the perceived 
ability of the victim and defendant to discriminate right and wrong at the time of the 
killing (1 = not at all, 10 = completely), and the perceived psychological stability of the 
victim and defendant both generally and at the time of the killing (four questions; 1 = not 
at all, 10 = completely). See Appendix C for the trial summary questionnaire. 
Moral justice scale. Participants completed Schadt and DeLisi’s (2007) 
questionnaire regarding belief in moral justice (see Appendix D). The questionnaire 
contains six items related to a belief in the use of moral justice. 
Legal justice scale. Additionally, participants completed Skitka and Houston’s 
(2005) moral mandate items (see Appendix E). The questionnaire contains seven items 
related to the belief of fairness and outcomes in the legal system. 
Procedure 
 Participants who signed up on Sona Systems at the University of Kentucky, a 
website that tracks and credits Introductory Psychology student research participants, 
were linked to surveymonkey.com for online study completion. An investigation of the 
costs and benefits of using Internet administration for psychological research indicates 
computer research findings are consistent with traditional research administration 
findings, and measures can be taken to insure the prevention of repeat responders, such as 
the recording of IP addresses (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). After 
consenting to participate, participants continued through the survey site. At various points 
throughout the trial summary, participants answered manipulation check questions, which 
must be answered correctly before participants could move to the next section. Following 
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reading the trial summary, participants responded to all questions. Upon completion of 
the entire study, a link to the consent form and a debriefing explanation was provided. 
Hypotheses 
There are five primary hypotheses for the present experiment as detailed below: 
1. A main effect of abuser gender, such that mock jurors will be more favorable 
toward women abusers (as victims) than men abusers (as victims). As a 
reminder, abuser (victim) gender is fixed with defendant gender, such that 
only heterosexual couples are included in the present study. Thus, it is 
predicted that conviction rates and guilt ratings will be higher when the 
defendant is a man who killed his abusive wife than when the defendant is a 
woman who killed her abusive husband. Additionally, rating variables will 
show the same favorability toward women over men; for example, it is 
hypothesized that men abusers will be perceived as more responsible for their 
own deaths than will women abusers. However, it is predicted that main 
effects of abuser gender will be qualified by interactions (see Hypotheses #2 
and #3). 
2. An Abuser Gender x Abuser Height interaction is predicted to emerge. In 
particular, it is predicted that preconceived gender norms regarding 
controlling violence (Kelly & Johnson, 2008) will impact the perception of 
abuse such that when the abuser is a man, abuser height will not be considered 
and the defendant will be convicted at rates comparable to those found in prior 
research. However, when the abuser is a woman, because of the perceived 
rarity of domestic violence perpetrated by women (George, 1994), participants 
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may use evidence differently to determine how they view the case. That is, in 
unfamiliar circumstances, research suggests people may use additional 
information to make an inference in order to consider the scenario more 
believable (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). Therefore, it is predicted that 
participants will render more guilty verdicts (convicting the man of killing his 
abusive wife) and rating guilty as higher when the woman abuser was shorter 
than her husband, versus when she was taller than her husband. 
3. An Abuser Gender x Child Presence interaction is predicted. Based on 
research that suggests women are held more accountable for the welfare of 
their children than are men (Edleson, 1998; Landsman & Hartley, 2007), it is 
predicted that when a child is present, participants will react differently to the 
information about a woman killing her abusive husband than they would 
should no child be present in the household. However, given this is the first 
study investigating the impact of child presence on juror perceptions of 
battered women who kill, it is unclear whether participants will consider the 
killing of her abuser as protective of the child – removing the abusive source 
in the household, albeit through a violent means; or, conversely, will consider 
the killing of her abuser as a further abusive act by permanently removing the 
child’s paternal figure and likely traumatizing the child with more violence. 
4. A main effect of a belief in moral justice, such that increased belief in moral 
justice will predict pro-defendant decision making. In particular, higher belief 
in moral justice should predict lower conviction rates and lower guilt ratings, 
as well as pro-defendant decisions for rating variables. 
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5. A main effect of a belief in legal justice, such that an increased belief in legal 
justice will lead to more pro-victim decision making. In contrast to predictions 
made for individuals who have higher belief in moral justice, a belief in legal 
justice is predicted to lead to higher conviction rates, higher guilt ratings, and 
pro-victim decisions among the rating variables. 
In addition to the five primary hypotheses in the present study, there are two other 
questions asked in the present study. After rendering verdicts, participants will be asked 
to write the reason they chose their verdict. This qualitative data will be examined to 
determine patterns that may begin to explain influences on the propensity to convict 
versus acquit. For example, the present study establishes the existence of police records 
and medical history that show evidence of a history of abuse perpetrated by the victim, 
but beliefs that domestic violence victims could leave the relationship may persist (see 
Greene et al., 1989). Thus, participants in the present study may be unwilling to acquit 
because they believe leaving the abusive relationship was a viable option for the 
defendant. Additionally, as the majority of prior research on battered women who kill 
their abusers render few guilty of first-degree murder verdicts (e.g., Schuller & Hastings, 
1996), qualitative data regarding participant’s reasons for verdict may begin to reveal 
influences that distinguish between a propensity to convict of first-degree manslaughter 
versus first-degree murder. Because of low power due to missing cells in the reason for 
verdict data, no statistical analyses will be presented on the reason for verdict data. 
Finally, an exploration of potential mediators in the present study will be 
conducted. That is, one or more of the rating variables (e.g., sympathy toward the victim) 
may mediate the relationship between one or more of the independent variables and the 
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primary dependent variable of interest, verdict. It should be noted that mediation analyses 
have not been conducted in prior research on battered women who kill their abusers. 
However, analyzing mediating variables in the present study may begin to explain how 
participants make decisions in cases in which a battered person kills his or her abuser.  
Analytic Strategy 
Prior to running analyses, the verdict data were examined to determine if there 
were an adequate number of murder verdicts to consider them separately from the 
manslaughter verdicts. Often in mock juror research investigating perceptions of battered 
women who kill their abusers the number of murder verdicts are low, requiring the 
manslaughter and murder verdicts to be collapsed, creating a binary verdict with guilty 
(murder + manslaughter) and not guilty verdicts (e.g., Follingstad et al., 1989; Hodell et 
al., 2008; Schuller & Hastings, 1996). In the present study, only 11.1% of the participants 
rated the defendant guilty of murder; thus, a binary verdict variable was created of guilty 
versus not guilty.  
A hierarchical logistic regression was run on verdict. On step 1, participant 
gender, ethnicity, and age were entered. By entering participant demographics first, a 
determination can be inferred regarding the unique contribution of the manipulated 
variables beyond the contribution of preexisting mock juror characteristics. On step 2, the 
main effects of abuser gender, abuser height, child presence, belief in legal justice and 
belief in moral justice were entered. The two predicted two-way interactions, Abuser 
Gender x Abuser Height and Abuser Gender x Child Presence were entered on step 3 (see 
Table 2.1 for regression model). 
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Table 2.1 
 
Regression Model 
 
Step 1 
 y = x1 + x2 + x3 
 
Step 2 
 y = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8 
 
Step 3 
 y = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8 + x9 + x10 
 
Note: 
y = Outcome variable 
x1 = Participant Gender 
x2 = Participant Sex 
x3 = Participant Ethnicity 
x4 = Abuser Gender 
x5 = Abuser Height 
x6 = Child Presence 
x7 = Belief in Moral Justice 
x8 = Belief in Legal Justice 
x9 = Abuser Gender x Abuser Height 
x10 = Abuser Gender x Child Presence 
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 To reduce the experiment-wise type I error rate, a factor analysis was conducted on 
all rating variables other than guilt. Principal components factor analysis with an oblimin 
rotation was used, as rating variables were correlated (see Table 2.2 for all correlations). 
Four factors emerged from the analysis. Factor 1 (witness credibility) included six 
variables: ratings of the credibility of the three witnesses presented by the defense and the 
three witnesses presented by the prosecution, with factor loadings ranging from .71 to 
.83. Factor 2 (sympathy toward the victim) included two items: sympathy toward the 
defendant and perceived fear experienced by the victim, with factor loadings of .70 and 
.83, respectively. Factor 3 (defendant psychological health) included three measures of 
the perceived psychological health of the defendant: the defendants’ ability to distinguish 
between right and wrong at the time of the killing (.76), the psychological stability of the 
defendant in general (.76), and the psychological stability of the defendant at the time of 
the killing (.89). Factor 4 (sympathy toward the defendant) included sympathy toward the 
defendant (.62), perceived fear experienced by the defendant (.86), and perceived 
credibility of the defendant’s testimony (.64). Responsibility of the victim for his/her own 
death and responsibility of the defendant for the victim’s death were analyzed 
independently because they did not load highly on any factor.  
Hierarchical linear regression was used to analyze all rating variables with the 
following entry process: For each variable, a regression was run using the following 
steps: on step 1, participant gender, ethnicity, and age were entered. On step 2, the main 
effects of abuser gender, abuser height, child presence, belief in legal justice, and belief 
in moral justice were entered. The Abuser Gender x Abuser Height interaction and the  
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Table 2.2 
 
Correlations for All Rating Variables 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Credibility: 
Veronica Sampson 
- .511** .532** .742** .571** 
2 Credibility: John 
Parsons 
.511*
* 
- .493** .468** .450** 
3 Credibility: Dr. 
Carla Fleming 
.532*
* 
.493** - .511** .635** 
4 Credibility: 
Michelle Perry 
.742*
* 
.468** .511** - .581** 
5 Credibility: Chief 
Gerald Colton 
.571*
* 
.450** .635** .581** - 
6 Credibility: Dr. 
Donald Adams 
.420*
* 
.364** .557** .458** .643** 
7 Credibility: 
Defendant 
.280*
* 
.185* .233** .444** .387** 
8 Responsibility of 
victim for death 
.060 -.043 .094 .078 .115 
9 Responsibility of 
defendant for death 
.256*
* 
.211** .252** .116 .174* 
10 Sympathy toward 
victim 
-.001 .063 -.081 -.081 -.063 
11 Sympathy toward 
defendant 
.146* -.010 .176* .198** .207** 
12 Fear experienced 
by victim 
-.020 .020 -.137 -.123 -.080 
13 Fear experienced 
by defendant 
.197*
* 
.116 .189** .246** .243** 
14 Defendant’s 
ability to distinguish 
right and wrong 
.069 .028 .056 .019 -.051 
15 Psychological 
stability of defendant 
in general 
.164* .110 .093 .224** .166* 
16 Psychological 
stability of defendant 
at time of killing 
.011 -.001 -.107 .027 -.057 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
  
 
 
 
Variable 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Credibility: 
Veronica Sampson 
.420** .280** .060 .256** -.001 .146* 
2 Credibility: John 
Parsons 
.364** .185* -.043 .211** .063 -.010 
3 Credibility: Dr. 
Carla Fleming 
.557** .233** .094 .252** -.081 .176* 
4 Credibility: 
Michelle Perry 
.458** .444** .078 .116 -.081 .198** 
5 Credibility: Chief 
Gerald Colton 
.643** .387** .115 .174* -.063 .207** 
6 Credibility: Dr. 
Donald Adams 
- .327** .090 .092 -.144 .191** 
7 Credibility: 
Defendant 
.327** - .336** -.112 -.249** .426** 
8 Responsibility of 
victim for death 
.090 .336** - -.198** -.400** .542** 
9 Responsibility of 
defendant for death 
.092 -.112 -.198** - .284** -.137 
10 Sympathy toward 
victim 
-.144 -.249* -.400** .284** - -.240** 
11 Sympathy toward 
defendant 
.191** .426** .542** -.137 -.240** - 
12 Fear experienced 
by victim 
-.067 -.205** -.351** .194** .454** -.174* 
13 Fear experienced 
by defendant 
.188** .436** .269** .000 -.249** .382** 
14 Defendant’s 
ability to distinguish 
right and wrong 
-.003 -.024 .029 -.050 .132 .119 
15 Psychological 
stability of defendant 
in general 
.051 .191** .183* -.075 -.125 .132 
16 Psychological 
stability of defendant 
at time of killing 
-.015 -.018 -.093 -.130 .077 -.007 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
Variable 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Credibility: 
Veronica Sampson 
-.020 .197** .069 .164* .011 
2 Credibility: John 
Parsons 
.020 .116 .028 .110 -.001 
3 Credibility: Dr. 
Carla Fleming 
-.137 .189** .056 .093 -.107 
4 Credibility: 
Michelle Perry 
-.123 .246** .019 .224** .027 
5 Credibility: Chief 
Gerald Colton 
-.080 .243** -.051 .166* -.057 
6 Credibility: Dr. 
Donald Adams 
-.067 .188* -.003 .051 -.015 
7 Credibility: 
Defendant 
-.205** .436** -.024 .191** -.018 
8 Responsibility of 
victim for death 
-.351** .269** .029 .183* -.093 
9 Responsibility of 
defendant for death 
.194** .000 -.050 -.075 -.130 
10 Sympathy toward 
victim 
.454** -.249** .132 -.125 .077 
11 Sympathy toward 
defendant 
-.174* .382** .119 .132 -.007 
12 Fear experienced 
by victim 
- -.007 .037 -.001 .151* 
13 Fear experienced 
by defendant 
-.007 - -.006 .138 -.017 
14 Defendant’s 
ability to distinguish 
right and wrong 
.037 -.006 - .410** .526** 
15 Psychological 
stability of defendant 
in general 
-.001 .138 .410** - .592** 
16 Psychological 
stability of defendant 
at time of killing 
.151* -.017 .526** .592** - 
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Abuser Gender x Child Presence interaction were entered on Step 3 (see Table 2.1 for all 
regression models). 
For significant factors, mediational analysis were used determine influences of 
both manipulated and non-manipulated variables on significant effects of the independent 
variables. Mediation analyses measure the degree to which a variable accounts for the 
relationship between an independent and dependent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986; see 
Figure 2.1). Mediation occurs when three conditions are met: (1) the IV significantly 
predicts the mediator, (2) the mediator significantly predicts the DV, and (3) the effect of 
the IV on the DV shrinks or disappears when the mediator is included in the model. If the 
effect of the IV on the DV disappears entirely with the presence of the mediator, the 
relationship between the IV and DV is entirely explained by the mediating variable. More 
commonly, the size of the effect is smaller with the presence of the mediating variable, 
suggesting a partial mediation, whereby multiple mediators may explain the relationship 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986).  
Sobel (1982) argued that researchers were too confident in drawing inferences on 
indirect effects found through path analysis or mediation without determining the 
significance of such effects. MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, and Sheets (2002) 
and Preacher and Hayes (2004) make the argument that a bootstrapping technique is the 
optimal means for testing significance in mediational models. Bootstrapping draws sub-
samples from the original sample and calculates the variance in the test statistics 
calculated from each sub-sample, resulting in a reliable confidence interval for the effect 
of each variable. The present study will use bootstrapping to analyze mediational 
variables. 
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Figure 2.1  
Mediation Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
a = raw regression coefficient for the association between IV and mediator. 
sa = standard error of a. 
b = raw coefficient for the association between the mediator and the DV. 
sb = standard error of b. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Verdict 
Across all conditions, conviction rates were 52.9%. More specifically, 47.1% of 
participants found the defendant not guilty by reason of self protection, 41.3% of 
participants rendered guilty of first-degree manslaughter verdicts, and 11.1% of 
participants convicted the defendant of first-degree murder. See Table 3.1 for all overall 
means and standard deviations. See Table 3.2 for means by condition. 
Moral Justice Scale 
To analyze a belief in moral justice, the item “Revenge killing is always wrong” 
was reverse scored. Reliability across the six items of the moral justice scale emerged as 
 = .84. The six variables were averaged to determine an overall individual score for 
belief in moral justice.  
Legal Justice Scale 
To analyze a belief in legal justice, the item “I never think about whether the 
outcomes of trials are fair or not” was reverse scored. Reliability across the seven legal 
justice scale items was  = .71. An average rating of all legal justice items was 
calculated. 
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Table 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Primary Variables 
Variable    M  SD 
 
Verdict  
(Not guilty = 0, Manslaughter = 1, Guilty = 2) 1.64  .68 
 
Dichotomous Verdict 
(Not guilty = 0, Guilty = 1)    .53  .50 
Guilt     5.01  2.61 
Belief in Moral Justice    4.49  2.04 
Belief in Legal Justice    7.36  1.45 
Witness Credibility    6.63  1.65 
Sympathy toward the victim            4.31  2.26 
Defendant psychological health    4.35  1.86  
Sympathy toward the defendant    7.16  1.59 
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Table 3.2 
Descriptive Statistics by Condition – Means (Standard Deviations) 
 
 
Variable                       Verdict            Guilt     Witness       Sympathy  
                    Credibility            Toward 
                  Victim 
 
Abuser Gender            
 
     Man      .41(.50)          4.50(2.54)         6.53(1.68)            3.73(2.17)        
 
     Woman        .64(.48)          5.50(2.59)         6.73(1.61)            4.90(2.21) 
 
Abuser Height               
 
     Abuser taller             .44(.50)          4.65(2.57)         6.56(1.68)            4.44(2.17)         
 
     Defendant taller        .62(.49)          5.35(2.61)         6.70(1.62)            4.18(2.36)          
 
Child Presence   
 
     Child      .46(.50)          4.74(2.64)         6.64(1.63)           4.18(2.20)        
 
     No Child   .60(.49)          5.26(2.56)         6.62(1.67)           4.44(2.33)         
 
 
Note: For Verdict: 0 = not guilty, 1 = guilty 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
 
Descriptive Statistics by Condition – Means (Standard Deviations) 
 
 
Variable   Defendant   Sympathy             Victim           Defendant 
            Psychological       Toward         Responsibility    Responsibility 
      Health              Defendant 
 
Abuser Gender 
 
     Man    4.22(1.84)         7.61(1.31)         7.13(2.25)         7.34(2.75) 
 
     Woman    4.48(1.87)         6.71(1.72)         5.92(2.31)         7.90(2.25) 
 
Abuser Height 
 
     Abuser taller   4.37(1.70)         7.29(1.60)         6.67(2.30)         7.44(2.69) 
 
     Def. taller          4.33(2.01)         7.03(1.57)         6.39(2.41)         7.80(2.34) 
 
Child Presence 
 
     Child    4.57(1.88)        7.25(1.65)          6.76(2.33)         7.57(2.55) 
 
     No child   4.12(1.81)        7.08(1.53)          6.30(2.36)         7.67(2.51) 
 
 
Note: For Verdict: 0 = not guilty, 1 = guilty 
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Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 – Main Effect of Abuser Gender 
 The binary logistic regression model on verdict was significant at step 2, with the 
entry of abuser gender, χ2 = 20.27, p = .001, B = 1.03, SE = .33, p = .002, OR = 2.80 (see 
Table 3.3 for all Odds Ratios). Specifically, participants were 2.8 times more likely to 
convict when a man killed his abusive wife than when a woman killed her abusive 
husband. The linear regression on guilt also produced a significant amount of variance 
explained with the addition of the main effects at step 2, R2 = .09, F(5,163) = 3.37, p = 
.006. Abuser gender was predictive of guilt ratings, such that participants rated a man 
who killed his abusive wife as more guilty than a woman who killed her abusive husband, 
B = 1.05, SE = .40, t(171) = 2.70, p = .008.  
The models for sympathy toward the victim and sympathy toward the defendant 
were both significant, R2 = .08, F(5,165) = 3.36, p = .013, and R2 = .24, F(5,164) = 
10.67, p < .001, respectively. Abuser gender emerged as predictive of sympathy toward 
the victim, B = 1.14, SE = .33, t(173) = 3.15, p = .002 and sympathy toward the 
defendant, B = -1.03, SE = .22, t(172) = 4.73, p < .001 (see Table 3.3 for all Betas). As 
expected, participants were more sympathetic toward a woman abuser who was killed by 
her husband than they were toward a man abuser who was killed by his wife and were 
more sympathetic toward the defendant when she was a woman who had killed her 
abusive husband than when he was a man who had killer his abusive wife.  
Contrary to predictions, the regression model for defendant’s responsibility for 
the victim’s death did not explain a significant amount of variance in the present study 
(all R2 p’s > .05). However, in keeping with predictions, the model for victim’s  
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Table 3.3 
Regression Model Results – Step 3 Models 
Verdict = 1.36 + .55 Participant Gender + .73 Participant Ethnicity + 1.01 Participant 
Age + 2.32 Abuser Gender + .34 Abuser Height + .60 Child Presence + .98 Moral 
Justice + 1.07 Legal Justice + 1.72 Abuser Gender x Abuser Height + .84 Abuser 
Gender x Child Presence 
 
Guilt = -.09 Participant Gender + .03 Participant Ethnicity + .06 Participant Age + .18 
Abuser Gender - .18 Abuser Height + .10 Child Presence - .14 Moral Justice - .02 
Legal Justice + .10 Abuser Gender x Abuser Height - .06 Abuser Gender x Child 
Presence 
 
Witness Credibility = .08 Participant Gender - .14 Participant Ethnicity + .00 Participant 
Age + .17 Abuser Gender - .06 Abuser Height + .12 Child Presence - .02 Moral 
Justice + .44 Legal Justice + .01 Abuser Gender x Abuser Height - .16 Abuser 
Gender x Child Presence 
 
Sympathy Toward the Victim = -.07 Participant Gender + .03 Participant Ethnicity - .09 
Participant Age + .30 Abuser Gender + .11 Abuser Height - .04 Child Presence - 
.06 Moral Justice - .13 Legal Justice - .05 Abuser Gender x Abuser Height - .06 
Abuser Gender x Child Presence 
 
Defendant Psychological Health = -.01 Participant Gender - .18 Participant Ethnicity - 
.10 Participant Age - .02 Abuser Gender + .03 Abuser Height + .03 Child 
Presence + .19 Moral Justice + .02 Legal Justice - .01 Abuser Gender x Abuser 
Height + .11 Abuser Gender x Child Presence 
 
Sympathy Toward the Defendant = .15 Participant Gender + .03 Participant Ethnicity - 
.01 Participant Age - .33 Abuser Gender + .05 Abuser Height + .09 Child 
Presence - .00 Moral Justice + .38 Legal Justice + .05 Abuser Gender x Abuser 
Height - .04 Abuser Gender x Child Presence 
 
Responsibility of the Defendant for the Victim’s Death = - .02 Participant Gender + .03 
Participant Ethnicity - .07 Participant Age + .20 Abuser Gender - .07 Abuser 
Height - .01 Child Presence - .01 Moral Justice + .16 Legal Justice - .04 Abuser 
Gender x Abuser Height - .10 Abuser Gender x Child Presence 
 
Responsibility of the Victim for Own Death = .17 Participant Gender + .09 Participant 
Ethnicity - .06 Participant Age - .33 Abuser Gender - .02 Abuser Height + .04 
Child Presence + .21 Moral Justice + .11 Legal Justice + .06 Abuser Gender x 
Abuser Height + .04 Abuser Gender x Child Presence 
 
Note: Odds ratios are presented for verdict; Betas are presented for all other regressions 
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responsibility for his or her own death was significant, R2 = .14, F(5,165) = 45.28, p < 
.001. In particular, abuser gender significantly predicted participants perception of the 
victim’s responsibility for his or her own death, B = -1.30, SE = .34, t(173) = 3.86, p < 
.001, with participants rating the victim as more responsible for his own death when the 
victim was a man abuser than when the victim was a woman abuser. 
Hypothesis 2 – Abuser Gender x Abuser Height Interaction 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported: the Abuser Height x Abuser Gender interaction 
did not emerge as significant for any variable, all p’s > .05. However, an unpredicted 
main effect of abuser height was found for verdict. When the abuser was described as 
taller than the defendant, participants were more likely to convict than when the 
defendant was taller than the abuser, B = -.83, SE = .33, p = .012, OR = .44, regardless of 
abuser gender. Despite being contrary to predictions, this main effect of abuser height 
indicates that the size of an abuser and their partner is influential in rendering decisions 
regarding the use of fatal force in violent relationships. Furthermore, the impact of size 
on decisions in cases involving a battered spouse who kills his or her abuser may be more 
a product of the necessity of the use of fatal force rather than about gender norms 
regarding size. 
Hypothesis 3 – Abuser Gender x Child Presence Interaction 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported: an interaction between abuser gender and child 
presence did not significantly predict variance for any dependent variable, all p’s > .05. 
Although not significant at p < .05, a trend emerged suggesting an potential impact of 
child presence. More specifically, when a child was present in the household, participants 
were less likely to convict than when there was not a child present in the household, B = -
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.60, SE = .33, p = .066, OR = .55. Similarly, child presence was marginally significant for 
predicting guilt ratings, with a trend suggesting participants may rate the defendant as 
more guilty when a child was not present in the household versus when a child was 
present in the household, B = -.69, SE = .39, t(171) = 1.77, p = .079. 
Hypothesis 4 – Main Effect of a Belief in Moral Justice 
Hypothesis 4 was generally unsupported, a belief in moral justice only 
significantly predicted perceptions of the victim’s responsibility for his or her own death, 
B = .24, SE = .09, t(173) = 2.73, p = .007, such that as a belief in moral justice increased, 
so did the perception that the victim was responsible for his or her own death.  
Hypothesis 5 – Main Effect of a Belief in Legal Justice 
Hypothesis 5 was also generally unsupported, but a belief in legal justice did 
predict two rating factors. The regression on witness credibility was significant at step 2, 
R2 = .20, F(5,152) = 8.25, p < .001. A belief in legal justice predicted ratings of witness 
credibility; as a belief in legal justice increased so did ratings of witness credibility, B = 
.51, SE = .08, t(166) = 6.24, p < .001. Additionally, a belief in legal justice predicted 
ratings of defendant sympathy, B = .43, SE = .08, t(173) = 5.53, p < .001, such that 
greater belief in the legal system led to higher ratings of sympathy for the defendant. 
Other Analyses 
Mediation Analyses  
 Given the predictive value of abuser gender, mediational analyses were run. Using 
the aforementioned criterion (Baron & Kenny, 1986), both sympathy toward the victim 
and sympathy toward the defendant qualified for testing mediation. For sympathy toward 
the victim, condition 1 was met – abuser gender significantly predicted sympathy toward 
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the victim. Condition 2 was also met – sympathy toward the victim significantly 
predicted verdict. Finally, condition 3 was partially met; there was a diminished effect of 
abuser gender on verdict with the inclusion of sympathy toward the victim in the model, 
B was diminished from 1.03 to .82, OR = 2.27. The bootstrapping analysis produced a 
confidence interval from .09 - .48 for sympathy toward the victim, p = .004. However, 
abuser gender remained a significant predictor of verdict with the inclusion of sympathy 
toward the victim at p < .05, indicating sympathy toward the victim is a partial mediator 
of the relationship between abuser gender and verdict.  
 Mediation analyses were also run to determine if sympathy toward the defendant 
mediated the relationship between abuser gender and verdict. Conditions 1 and 2 were 
met – abuser gender significantly predicted sympathy toward the defendant and sympathy 
toward the defendant significantly predicted verdict. For condition 3, when sympathy 
toward the defendant was included in the model, the effect of abuser gender on verdict 
was extinguished. The B for abuser gender went from 1.03 without sympathy toward the 
defendant in the model to .54 with the inclusion of sympathy toward the defendant, 
making it non-significant p = .14, OR = 1.72. The bootstrapping analysis produced a 
confidence interval from -1.09 – 1.63 for sympathy toward the defendant, p = .001. This 
effect indicates sympathy toward the defendant was a full mediator of the relationship 
between abuser gender and verdict.  
Qualitative Reason for Verdict Data 
 Reason for verdict data was scored by the primary researcher and a research 
assistant; agreement between scorers was  = .98. The most commonly cited reason for 
not guilty by reason of self protection verdicts was a belief that the defendant was acting 
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in protection of him- or herself and/or his or her child, with 68% of the sample citing 
such reasons. Sixty-one percent of participants who voted not guilty cited evidence of 
physical abuse as a reason for their verdicts. Also, 37% of participants said that the threat 
on his or her life was a reason for participants belief in his or her use of self protection 
and thereby led to their acquittal. An example of a typical response by a participant who 
rendered a not guilty verdict was: “She was being threatened and her husband actually 
brought the gun into the TV room. He had already thrown hot oil on her so I think that 
she was defending herself from any other harm from him.” 
 In analyzing reason for verdict data for participants who rendered verdicts of guilty 
of first-degree manslaughter, responses varied as to reason for verdict. Some participants 
wrote from the perspective of providing leniency with a manslaughter verdict; others 
seemed to feel their verdicts were punitive. The reasons for verdict were varied: 31% of 
participants said they chose a manslaughter verdict because they felt the situation lacked 
the imminence needed for a self-defense verdict. Twenty-nine percent of participants 
cited their reason for a manslaughter verdict was related to the belief that the defendant 
should have pursued alternative options. In contrast to these reasons being related to the 
punitive nature of a guilty of manslaughter verdict, 22% of participants cited their reason 
for a manslaughter verdict, as opposed to a not guilty by reason of self-protection verdict, 
was because of the perceived reality of the threat to the defendant’s safety. 
Mock jurors who convicted the defendant of murder cited two primary reasons for 
their choice of verdict. Thirty-three percent of the participants who voted guilty of 
murder cited their reason as the belief that the defendant should have pursued alternatives 
to killing, such as leaving or calling police. For example, one mock juror stated: “If she 
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needed to be protected she could [have] gone to the police…”. Thirty-eight percent of the 
participants who voted guilty did so because the victim was not actively attacking the 
defendant during the killing; the killing occurred during a brief lull in the violence. As 
one participant wrote: “Although he claims self defense, the victim was not currently 
eliciting any actual physical force against him, only verbal.” 
With regard to the impact of child presence, some participants mentioned an 
influence of the presence of a child in the household on their verdicts. Twenty-eight 
percent of participants who received a child present condition and acquitted the defendant 
mentioned the child in their reason for verdict. As an example, one participants who 
voted not guilty stated: “There was also a child involved that could have been hurt so I 
felt that Mrs. Morrison was not only protecting herself but also her son.” Eighteen 
percent of participants who received a child present condition and convicted the 
defendant of first-degree manslaughter mentioned the child in their reason for verdict 
data. Despite a small proportion of the participants mentioning the child as an influential 
factor in their decision-making process, it was clear that for some mock jurors, child 
presence had a substantial impact on their verdict. No participants mentioned 
administering a more punitive verdict because of the presence of the child; rather, all 
mention of the child was acknowledgment that the killing was in protection of the child’s 
life. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Discussion 
 The present study suggested gender biases extend beyond perceptions of IPV cases 
to extreme cases of violence during which a battered person kills his or her abuser. With 
regard to gender biases, across the board, abuser gender reached significance as a main 
effect. In contrast to when a battered man kills his abuser, when a battered woman kills 
her abuser, mock jurors were more likely to acquit the woman, find her less guilty, and 
were more sympathetic toward her. Furthermore, participants were more sympathetic 
toward abusive women who were killed by their husbands than when the victim was a 
man, and felt that men who were killed by their wives were more responsible for their 
own deaths. Overall, these patterns suggest that it is still more socially acceptable for a 
woman to kill her abuser than it is for the equivalent situation with the gender roles 
reversed.  
 Analyses indicated that participants’ sympathy toward the victim and sympathy 
toward the defendant partially mediated the relationship between abuser gender and 
verdict. Although determining partial mediation provides some insight into the reasons 
behind a verdict in these cases, Bullock, Green, and Ha (2010) caution against overstating 
the influence of mediational analyses, particularly those that are not manipulated 
variables. It is likely that sympathy toward the victim and defendant are related to other 
variables not included in the present study. For example, sympathy toward the victim 
may be related to personal victimization status or a belief in traditional gender roles, 
among other possibilities. However, the present study suggests feelings of sympathy 
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among mock jurors are enough to influence verdicts in cases in which a battered person 
kills his or her abuser, and therefore merits further investigation. 
 One potential reason mock jurors are biased about IPV cases in general, and 
perhaps specifically to cases in which a battered person kills his or her abuser is the 
perception that men are larger than women, and therefore should be able to dominate or 
control women without the necessity of deadly force. Contrary to a predicted interaction 
between abuser gender and abuser height, conviction rates were higher when an abuser 
was taller than his or her partner versus when the abuser was shorter, regardless of abuser 
gender. Thus the contradiction in gender norms of a woman being taller than her partner 
(Migliaccio, 2002) did not impact decisions in this case; instead, the size of abusive 
individuals was likely predictive of the perceived need for the use of deadly force by their 
partners. This finding may be more a product of the issue of perceived imminence than it 
is about gender bias. That is, when an abuser is taller than his or her partner, danger may 
be perceived as more imminent than when an abuser is shorter than his or her partner, 
necessitating fatal force. Certainly, the finding that height in the present study impacts 
conviction rates indicates further research on size and the necessity of fatal force is 
merited.  
 With regard to child presence in the present study, minimal effects were found. 
Although the impact of child presence did not reach significance, there is enough 
evidence present to recommend a more focused investigation into the role of children in 
the household in cases in which battered persons kill their abusers. As previously 
discussed, women are held responsible for the welfare of their children more so than are 
men, even when the man is the abuser in the situation (Edleson, 1998; Landsman & 
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Hartley, 2007). Thus, the present study aimed to investigate if the removal of a child from 
an IPV situation through violent means would be perceived as more damaging to the 
child (i.e., subjecting a child to the loss of a parent, potential knowledge of the violent 
act), or would be perceived as protective of the child (i.e., removes the child from the 
household and prevents future potential for victimization). It was predicted that an 
Abuser Gender x Child Presence interaction would emerge, such that child presence 
would impact conviction rates when the defendant was a woman, but not when the 
defendant was a man. This hypothesis was not supported. However, the present study did 
suggest that the killing of an abusive partner was perceived as protective of a child in the 
household, regardless of which parent was abusive. With regard to quantitative data, a 
trend suggested that conviction rates and guilt ratings were lower when a child was 
present in the household, as compared to when the couple did not have a child.  
 As indicated by the reason for verdict data, some participants felt strongly that the 
killing of an abusive partner was an act that was protective of the defendant’s child. It is 
notable that in the present study, a college sample was used, making it unlikely that many 
of the participants were parents. It is entirely possible that parental status would predict a 
stronger reaction to the presence of a child in the household. Although more conclusive 
results were not obtained in the present study regarding child presence, the present study 
does provide some information on the likely direction of the perception of children in the 
household. The present study suggests that participants are unlikely to perceive the 
killing of an abusive partner as further abuse against a child by removing a parental unit 
or exposing them to trauma. In contrast, participants may perceive the killing of an 
abusive partner a protective act for children in the home. 
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 In addition to variables related to characteristics about the case, the present study 
examined the influence of individual characteristics on courtroom decision making. 
Specifically, the present study investigated whether a propensity to acquit or convict was 
related to an individual belief in vigilante or moral justice, or to a belief in the legal 
system process. Although the hypotheses were not fully supported regarding individual 
belief in moral or legal justice, the present experiment illuminated some predictive value 
of each of these measures on rating variables. Specifically, a greater belief in moral 
justice predicted higher perceptions of the victim’s responsibility for his or her own 
death. As expected, a greater belief in moral justice predicted the perception that an 
abusive partner who is killed deserved the retaliation because of their prior arguably 
immoral actions. A belief in legal justice predicted higher ratings of perceived witness 
credibility, as one may expect. That is, one who believes strongly in the efficacy of the 
justice system and in the fairness of legal outcomes is also likely to have more faith in the 
credibility of eyewitnesses. Contrary to what common sense would suggest, a belief in 
legal justice also predicted higher ratings of sympathy for the defendant. In cases in 
which a battered person kills his or her abuser, it may be that despite believing in fairness 
of the legal system, people who are high on belief in legal justice still appreciate the 
predicament the defendant may have felt he or she was in by being in a chronically 
abusive relationship and therefore have higher ratings of sympathy for the defendant than 
those who have a lower belief in legal justice. 
As an examination of other potential mechanisms behind mock juror decision 
making in the present study, the reason for verdict data for manslaughter and murder 
convictions revealed some interesting effects. Nearly one-third of participants mentioned 
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a lack of imminence as their reasons for rendering manslaughter convictions versus 
acquittals. In contrast, 22% of participants mentioned a belief that imminence was 
present, leading to their manslaughter convictions versus murder convictions. Thirty-
eight percent of participants who convicted the defendant of murder did so because of a 
belief of lack of imminence, perhaps placing even greater emphasis on the necessity of 
imminence in such cases. As previously discussed, the use of not guilty by reason of self-
defense pleas can be difficult to obtain, possibly because of the missing imminence that is 
required by legal self-defense language. 
In addition to the perception of imminence being influential on verdict decision 
making, as expected, almost one-third of participants who voted guilty of manslaughter 
and one-third of participants who voted guilty of murder mentioned a belief that 
alternative solutions, such as leaving or calling police, should have been pursued rather 
than the use of lethal force. The present study made clear that the defendant pursued both 
police and hospital intervention previously, but that information failed to alleviate 
persisting beliefs that battered men and women can successfully leave violent 
relationships without the need for physical force. 
 In contrast to some prior research (e.g., Follingstad et al., 1997; Kasian et al., 
1993; Terrance et al., 2000) participant gender did not predict a significant amount of 
variance in the present study. Approximately one quarter of the participants in the present 
experiment were men; it is possible that there was insufficient power to detect significant 
differences between men and women participants. Participant age and ethnicity also did 
not predict a significant amount of variance in the present study; the population of 
participants was a sample of undergraduate students, making the participant population 
 
60  
more homogonous with regard to age, education level, and marital status than that of the 
general population. Although some research indicates minimal differences between 
community and college samples (e.g., Bornstein, 1999), it is possible different results 
would emerge among a more experienced sample of community members. Despite this 
possibility, it should be noted that all participants in the present study were over 18 years 
old and were U.S. citizens, and therefore jury eligible.  
 A limitation with the present study that must be acknowledged is, arguably, a lack 
of ecological validity because of the use of trial summaries. Although mock juror 
research using trial summaries does not provide the breadth of information real jurors 
encounter in court cases, the methodology does allow for stringent control of variables. 
Kerr and Bray (2005) conducted an exhaustive analysis of methodological costs and 
benefits to mock trial simulations and caution researchers against over-generalizing 
results from mock trial simulations, but maintain that the mock trial is a viable and 
worthwhile methodology. In particular, Kerr and Bray point out that information from 
mock trial research is incredibly valuable in guiding more applied research, and in their 
potential for real-world implications. Additionally, the present study did not include a 
deliberation process. Although deliberations may give mock jurors a better grasp of the 
case in general, as well as direct attention to specifics of the case, Diamond (1997) notes 
that individual mock juror judgments are typically in line with judgments rendered by 
juries.  
 In sum, the present study was the first to investigate the role of gender in cases in 
which a battered person killed his or her abuser. Recently, research has focused largely 
on the equities and inequities amongst men and women perpetrated violence (e.g., 
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Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2005; Reed et al., 2005). Although research shows women 
self-reportedly engage in controlling violence (Graham-Kevan & Archer, 2005), no 
research has investigated the alleged killing of women who engage in violence against 
their men spouses. The failure to identify killing in self defense by battered men 
exacerbates societal resistance to accepting and acknowledging the possibility of such 
cases. To date, the public generally fails to acknowledge the issue of battered men; thus, 
few resources are provided for men who are battered by women. Future research 
identifying cases in which battered men kill their women abusers is needed, as is public 
policy and public awareness that such cases exist.  
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Appendix A 
 
Trial Summary 
 
Note: Child condition addition in italics 
 
The Commonwealth of Kentucky     KRS 507.020(1)(a) 
      vs.         (Murder) 
Frank Morrison        Defendant 
 
Case background:  
 
On or about the 11th day of June, 2009, in Fayette County, Kentucky, the above-
named defendant committed murder by shooting Beth Morrison, a 5’6” woman, with a 
shotgun. It was alleged that Beth Morrison was killed by her 35-year-old husband Frank 
Morrison, a 5’11” man in their residence on the evening of June 11, 2009 at 
approximately 6:35PM.  The state called on three witnesses for the prosecution: Vernon 
Sampson (a 38-year-old co-worker of the defendant), John Parsons (a neighbor of the 
Morrison's), and Doctor Carla Fleming, (the doctor who performed the autopsy on Beth 
Morrison). 
Frank Morrison pleaded not guilty due to self-defense. The defense stated that the 
deceased, Beth Morrison, threatened Frank’s life. The defense argued that the defendant 
had reason to believe that Beth Morrison would kill him and, therefore, was forced to kill 
his wife in self-defense. The defense also argued that Frank Morrison was never before in 
serious trouble with the law. The defense called three witnesses: Michael Perry (a 32-
year-old co-worker of the defendant), the defendant himself (Frank Morrison), and Chief 
of Police Gerald Colton. 
Based on prior evidence, the Prosecution and Defense stipulate that the defendant 
(Frank Morrison) was physically abused by his wife Beth Morrison (the deceased). In 
particular, documentation of abuse entered into evidence included medical records of 
prior burns, lacerations, and a broken finger inflicted on Frank Morrison by Beth 
Morrison. Additionally, police records show two police responses to domestic violence 
calls at the Morrison residence on which Beth Morrison is recorded as the perpetrator of 
the abuse. 
 
Prosecution’s Case 
 
Prosecution Witness No. 1: Vernon Sampson 
Direct Examination 
Vernon Sampson was a 38-year-old co-worker of the defendant who knew the 
defendant for nine years. Mr. Sampson stated that the day before the event, June 11, 
2009, the defendant called Mr. Sampson and told him that his marriage was going terribly 
and that his wife was constantly angry with him for not doing enough around the house. 
Moreover, Frank said his wife seemed more concerned about going to work and watching 
TV than she did about Frank or their son Eric. Mr. Sampson said he felt that Frank was 
very upset and angry with his wife. 
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Appendix A (continued) 
 
Cross Examination 
Mr. Sampson said that in the nine years he had known the defendant, Frank had 
never been in any serious trouble. However, Mr. Sampson admitted that he rarely saw 
Frank outside of work, so it was possible Frank was involved in behavior he was able to 
hide at work. Mr. Sampson also admitted that he could have misread Frank’s emotions 
and that Frank could have been scared instead of angry.  
 
Prosecution Witness No. 2: John Parsons 
Direct Examination 
Mr. Parsons was the next-door neighbor of the Morrison's. He stated that he saw 
the defendant shoot his wife from a distance of 6 feet away in the family living room on 
the evening of June 11, 2009 at approximately 6:35 PM. He stated that he witnessed the 
event through the Morrison's front window as he was walking past their house.  
 
Cross Examination 
Mr. Parsons stated that the lighting outside was beginning to dim because of the 
time of day and that he could not see the entire situation through the window. He also 
stated that the distance he was from the window (the defense measures at 29 feet) did not 
allow him to hear any sounds other than the gunshot. 
 
Prosecution Witness No. 3: Dr. Carla Fleming 
Direct Examination 
Dr. Fleming stated that she is a licensed doctor. She received her M.D. from 
Harvard University and has testified in ten other court trials. Dr. Fleming stated that she 
performed the autopsy on the victim, Beth Morrison. Dr. Fleming indicated that the cause 
of death determined by the autopsy was one shotgun wound to the chest. 
 
Cross Examination 
Dr. Fleming admitted that she did not know why or how the shooting occurred. 
She also could not determine if the shooting was purposeful or accidental based on the 
wound. 
 
Defendant's Case 
 
Defense Witness No. 1: Michael Perry 
Direct Examination 
Michael Perry was a 32-year-old co-worker of the defendant. He stated that on the 
day prior to the event, June 11, 2009, Mr. Perry had lunch with the defendant. Mr. Perry 
said that Frank Morrison said that his wife was scaring him lately with her anger and that 
he was worried that she was going to do “something bad” to Frank. 
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Cross Examination 
Mr. Perry admitted that he had seen Frank seem anxious on other occasions. Mr. 
Perry also indicated that Frank often discussed problems with his wife, so Mr. Perry did 
not take this occasion of Frank’s fear more serious than other similar situations in the 
past. 
 
Defense Witness No. 2: Frank Morrison 
Direct Examination 
Frank Morrison stated he was afraid that his wife was going to hurt or kill him. 
He stated that on the night in question, their son Eric was playing in his bedroom and 
Frank was cooking dinner for himself and his wife. Frank and his wife had been arguing 
about the dish Frank had chosen to cook for dinner. Frank said he had chosen to cook 
chicken but his wife wanted fish. Frank said that he was in the kitchen at around 6:15 pm 
preparing dinner. Frank said he had started heating oil in a saucepan when his wife came 
into the kitchen. Frank said that his wife picked up the frying pan and threw the contents 
at Frank, causing burns that blistered on his neck and left shoulder. She said to Frank “I 
told you I don’t want your disgusting meal. Clean this up and cook the fish. Then maybe 
I will let you live. You know I will blow your brains out.” Frank said that he watched his 
wife walk into the bedroom and get the shotgun out of the closet and bring it into the 
family living room where she sat down on the couch and turned on the TV with the 
shotgun next to her. Frank said that earlier in the week his wife had threatened to “blow 
his head off with her shotgun in the car and then push the car into the lake where he 
would never be found.” Frank stated that he was terrified that his wife was actually going 
to kill him and it was only a matter of time until she did. Frank said that he knew the only 
way he and his son would be safe is if he killed his wife before she could kill him. Frank 
said that he did not remember exactly what he was thinking when he ran over, grabbed 
the shotgun, and shot her. Immediately after Frank shot her, he dropped the shotgun and 
ran to the phone to call 911. 
 
Cross Examination 
Frank Morrison admitted that his wife had threatened to kill him as many as 5 
times over the past 2 years. Frank said that he did not know if his wife would have 
actually ever killed him. Frank also admitted he had never tried to leave his wife, but said 
that he was afraid of what she would do if he left and she found him. 
 
 
Defense Witness No. 3: Chief of Police Gerald Colton 
Direct Examination 
 Chief Colton said that Frank Morrison did not have a police record. He said that on 
the night in question, June 11, the 911 emergency line received a call from the Morrison 
household at 6:42 PM that someone had been shot. Police were dispatched and said that 
at the scene, Beth Morrison had sustained a fatal shotgun wound and was pronounced 
dead on the scene. Frank Morrison immediately had indicated that he had shot his wife 
and police had taken him into custody. He was initially transported to the  
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hospital for treatment for burns on his neck and shoulder and was later transferred to the 
Fayette County Detention Center for immediate holding. A family friend of the 
Morrison’s agreed to take care of the Morrison’s son Eric, and picked him up within a 
half hour of the arrival of police at the Morrison home. 
 
Cross Examination 
 Chief Colton said he had never personally visited the Morrison residence in 
response to a domestic violence call prior to the night in question. In addition, Chief 
Colton said although Frank immediately confessed to shooting his wife, Frank seemed 
somewhat out of it and confused to him. 
 
 
Instructions to Jurors 
 
Instruction No. 1 
Murder; Intentional 
 
You will find the Defendant guilty of Murder under the following Instruction if, 
and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the 
following: 
A. That in this county on or about June 11, 2009 and before the finding of the 
Indictment herein, Frank Morrison killed Beth Morrison by shooting her with 
a shotgun; 
AND 
B. That in so doing, he caused the death of Beth Morrison intentionally; 
AND 
C. That in so doing, he was not privileged to act in self-protection; 
AND 
D. That in so doing, he was not privileged to act in protection of another. 
 
Note: Intentional Murder carries a minimum sentence of 25 years and 
convicted persons are eligible for the death penalty. 
 
Instruction No. 2 
First-Degree Manslaughter, Intent to Kill or Injure 
 
If you do not find the Defendant guilty of Murder under Instruction No. 1, you 
will find the Defendant guilty of First-Degree Manslaughter under this Instruction if, and 
only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: 
A. That in this county on or about June 11, 2009 and before the finding of the 
Indictment herein, Frank Morrison killed Beth Morrison by shooting her; 
AND 
B. That in so doing: 
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 (a) He intended to cause serious physical injury to another person, and 
thereby caused the death of such person or of a third person; or  
(b) He intended to cause the death of another person, and thereby caused 
the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not 
constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance; 
AND 
C. That in so doing, he was not privileged to act in self-protection; 
AND 
D. That in so doing, he was not privileged to act in protection of another. 
 
Note: First-Degree Manslaughter carries a minimum sentence of 10 years and 
a maximum sentence 20 years in prison. 
 
Instruction No. 3 
Self-Protection 
 
 Even though the Defendant might otherwise be guilty of Murder under Instruction 
No. 1 or First-Degree Manslaughter under Instruction No. 2, if at the time the Defendant, 
Frank Morrison, killed Beth Morrison, he believed that Beth Morrison was then and there 
about to use physical force upon him, Frank Morrison was privileged to use such physical 
force against Beth Morrison as he believed to be necessary in order to protect himself 
from death or serious physical injury at the hands of Beth Morrison.  
 
Note: Self-protection is a not guilty verdict; therefore, acquittal by self-
protection carries no sentence. 
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Manipulation Check Questions 
 
1. Who is taller? 
a. Frank Morrison 
b. Beth Morrison 
 
2. Who is the defendant in this case? 
a. Frank Morrison 
b. Beth Morrison 
c. Gerald Colton 
 
3. Who was abusive? 
a. Beth Morrison 
b. Frank Morrison 
 
4. How does Mrs. Sampson know the defendant? 
a. They are cousins 
b. They are co-workers 
 
5. What sound did Mr. Parson hear when he witnessed the event? 
a. A gunshot and screaming 
b. A gunshot 
 
6. Where did Dr. Fleming receive her M.D.? 
a. Harvard 
b. Stanford 
 
7. How does Ms. Perry know the defendant? 
a. They were neighbors 
b. They were co-workers 
 
8. What reason did the defendant give for killing her husband? 
a. He was annoying her and she wanted him gone 
b. He was abusive toward her and feared for her life 
 
9. Did the Morrison’s have a child? 
a. Yes, a son 
b. Yes, a daughter 
c. No 
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Trial Summary Questionnaire 
Note: All rating variables appeared on a 1-10 scale with only the endpoints labeled. 
 
1. How would you rate the guilt of the defendant (Beth Morrison) in this case?  
 
2. What is your verdict in this case?  
Not Guilty      Guilty of First-Degree Manslaughter            Guilty of First-Degree 
Murder 
By reason of 
self protection 
 
3a. As specifically as possible, please state why you chose a not guilty by reason of self 
protection verdict. 
 
3b. As specifically as possible, please state why you chose a guilty of first-degree 
manslaughter verdict. 
 
3c. As specifically as possible, please state why you chose a guilty of murder verdict. 
 
4. How credible did you find the testimony of Veronica Sampson (co-worker of the 
defendant; testimony for the prosecution)? 
  
5. How credible did you find the testimony of John Parsons (neighbor of the defendant; 
testimony for the prosecution)? 
  
6. How credible did you find the testimony of Dr. Carla Fleming (testimony for the 
prosecution)? 
 
7. How credible did you find the testimony of the co-worker of the defendant, Michelle 
Perry (testimony for the defense)? 
 
8. How credible did you find the testimony of the Chief of Police Gerald Colton 
(testimony for the defense)? 
 
9. How credible did you find the testimony of Dr. Donald Adams (testimony for the 
defense)? 
 
10. How credible did you find testimony of the defendant (Beth Morrison, the wife)? 
 
11. How responsible was the victim (Frank Morrison, the husband) for his own death? 
 
12. How responsible was the defendant (Beth Morrison, the wife) for the victim’s death? 
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13. How much sympathy did you feel toward the victim (Frank Morrison, the husband)? 
 
14. How much sympathy did you feel toward the defendant (Beth Morrison, the wife)? 
 
15. How much fear do you think the victim (Frank Morrison, the husband) was 
experiencing just before the killing? 
 
16. How much fear do you think the defendant (Beth Morrison, the wife) was 
experiencing just before the killing? 
 
17. How much was the defendant (Beth Morrison, the wife) able to distinguish between 
right and wrong at the time of the killing? 
 
18. In general, how psychologically stable do you feel the defendant (Beth Morrison, the 
wife) was in her life? 
 
19. At the time of the killing, how psychologically stable was the defendant (Beth 
Morrison, the wife)? 
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Appendix D 
Belief in Moral Justice Scale 
1. If anyone ever victimized my family I would be tempted to hurt the person 
responsible. 
2. If anyone ever victimized my family I would hurt the person responsible. 
3. If anyone hurt my family I would be tempted to kill the person responsible. 
4. If anyone hurt my family I would kill the person responsible. 
5. Revenge killing is always wrong. 
6. If someone were to rape your mother than you would be morally justified in killing 
the perpetrator. 
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Belief in Legal Justice Scale 
1. For justice to be served, the innocent must be acquitted and the guilty convicted. 
2. A criminal trial is just if it yields the right outcome. 
3. It is extremely important to me that criminal trials arrive at the correct outcome 
(i.e., that the guilty are convicted and that the innocent go free). 
4. The only just outcome of trials that involve defendants who actually committed the 
crime for which they are being tried is a conviction. 
5. The only just outcome of trials that involve defendants who did not actually 
commit the crime for which they are being tried is acquittal. 
6. Because it ensures a just legal system, I can tolerate the notion of some guilty 
people going free because their guilt could not be proven beyond a shadow of a 
doubt. 
7. I never think about whether the outcomes of trials are fair.  
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